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Introduction 
The African swine fever virus (ASFV) isolate circulating 
in the Trans Caucasian Countries (TCC) and the Russian 
Federation (RF) is a highly virulent virus that has 
maintained its virulence since the first outbreak in 
Georgia in 2007 (1). ASFV can be transmitted by direct 
contact between infected porcine species, fomites, through 
ingestion of contaminated feeds or by the soft tick 
Ornithodoros spp. (2). In order to determine the extent of 
the disease situation in the Caucasus and to enhance the 
preparedness in the EU, the European Commission 
requested the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to 
assess the risk that ASFV remains endemic in those 
neighbouring countries to the EU; the risk that it will 
become endemic in the EU, if introduced; and to 
determine the role played by ticks in the spread and the 
maintenance of ASF. 
 
Materials and methods 
A thorough review of literature and unpublished data was 
retrieved to provide the essential background information 
to perform the risk assessment. Due to scarcity of 
quantitative data, a systematic qualitative risk assessment 
framework, based on OIE guidelines (3), was chosen to 
address the Terms of Reference. A generic risk 
assessment model was developed outlining 5 risk 
pathways corresponding to 5 risk questions. These risk 
pathways consist of consecutive steps that need to happen 
to lead to endemicity of ASFV in the EU swine 
population. The resulting tool allows risk managers to 
follow the conclusions of the risk assessors and to identify 
where the main risks or uncertainties lie (4). Objectivity 
and transparency of the risk estimates were achieved 
through consensus finding of the expert panel (15 experts 
from various backgrounds) and use of combination 
matrices to combine risk estimates. 
 
Results 
The literature review and expert opinion revealed that 
ASF has spread in the TCC and in the RF since 2007 and 
that the measures put in place have not been sufficient to 
control the spread (5, 6). Accurate assessment of the 
incidence and prevalence of ASF in the TCC and RF, 
however, is difficult due to limited availability of reliable 
surveillance data. The epidemiological role played by 
domestic pigs and wild boar is difficult to assess since 
very little information is available on the geographical 
distribution and the population size of both free ranging 
pigs and wild boar. Generally, movement of wild boar is 
limited geographically, although direct contact between 
wild boar sounders is frequent due to their social 
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behaviour (7) and spread of ASFV is possible though 
connected wild boar populations. 
The most likely route of introduction of ASFV into the 
EU is the illegal movement of food waste. According to 
the EU legislation, all trade and import to the EU of live 
pigs and products of pig origin from the TCC and the RF 
is banned (8). Illegal imports of live pigs and products of 
pig origin are impossible to quantify due to lack of data. 
Further, waste food from international means of transport 
is not always treated according to the EU legislation (9) 
and there is considerable movement of people (and with 
them potentially infected pork products) between the 
Eastern neighbouring countries of the EU and the EU MS 
which is difficult to control. Among the EU MS, the 
volume of live pigs and pork traded is substantial and 
varies by year and region/country. (10).  
Bites from infected Ornithodoros ticks are efficient routes 
of transmission of ASFV (11, 12) but their role in the 
current outbreaks in the TCC and the RF is unknown. 
Ticks of the Ornithodoros erraticus complex can be 
important in maintaining local foci of ASFV (13, 14) 
where pigs are kept in traditional husbandry systems (12). 
These ticks, however, do not play an active role in the 
geographical spread of the virus. Due to the limited 
available data on associated factors with the distribution 
of soft ticks, prediction of their potential distribution is 
difficult to make.  
Based on the risk assessment, the working group 
concluded that, overall, there is a moderate risk 
(occurrence of event is a possibility) that ASFV will 
maintain itself in the TCC and RF swine populations and 
that it will be introduced in the EU, e.g. by introduction of 
food waste or by connected wild boar populations. 
Discussion 
An integrated strategy involving TCC, the RF and the EU, 
including an information exchange platform, would 
facilitate the trans-boundary control of ASF. The 
reduction of the risk for ASFV endemicity in TCC and RF 
and spread to other regions can be achieved by supporting 
enhancement of early warning and preparedness and 
strengthening rapid and long term control responses.  
Also the development of a specific ASF eradication 
strategy for backyard holdings in TCC, RF and EU was 
recommended and knowledge and implementation of 
biosecurity principles, including mechanisms to reduce or 
prevent contact between domestic pigs and wild boar in 
TCC, the RF and the EU should be promoted.  
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